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Abstract 
The  no  miracles  argument  for  scientific  realism  coheres  with  the  law  of  identity,  the  law  of 
noncontradiction,  and  the  principle  of  bivalence.  This  paper  introduces  a  model  of  social  systems 
ranging  from  jawless  vertebrates  to  legal  systems  that  coheres  with  the  no  miracles  argument  and 
resolves  puzzles  about  identity  and  mereology.  Major  focuses  of  the  model  are  the  natural 
interactions  that  cause  organization,  the  dynamics  of  scientific  entities,  and  the  composition  of 
social  groups  which  includes  communication  and  the  emergence  of  synergy. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Putnam  (1975:  73)  suggested  the  no  miracles  argument  for  scientific  realism  when  he  essentially 
said  that  realism  is  the  only  philosophy  that  does  not  turn  the  success  of  science  into  a  miracle. 
He  made  this  suggestion  when  he  was  an  internal  realist ,  which  means  that  he  rejected  the  reality 
of  facts  and  respective  objective  truth  also  known  as  mind-independent  truth .  Perhaps,  his 
suggestion  of  the  no  miracles  argument  had  eventually  convinced  himself  to  become  a 
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 metaphysical  realist ,  which  means  he  accepts  the  reality  of  facts.  In  any  case,  Putnam  (2015) 
clearly  states  that  he  shifted  from  internal  realism  to  metaphysical  realism. 
This  paper  applies  the  no  miracles  argument  to  what  I  call  verified  social  systems . 
Verified  social  systems  are  quantifiable  social  systems  that  are  verified  by  global  scientific 
consensus.  Examples  of  verified  social  systems  are  insect  colonies,  schools  of  fish,  flocks  of 
birds,  herds  of  mammals,  primate  social  groups,  social  norms,  legal  entities,  and  monetary 
systems. 
The  existence  of  quantifiable  social  systems  are  uncontroversial  in  their  respective 
sciences  such  as  zoology,  sociology,  jurisprudence,   economics,  human  geography,  demography, 1
political  science,  anthropology,  and  quantitative  history.  However,  the  social  systems  are 
controversial  in  the  field  of  metaphysics,  such  as  the  theory  of  parts  called  mereology .  For 
example,  metaphysicians  typically  hold  to  classical  mereology  which  says  an  emergent  entity 
cannot  have  parts  while  an  entity  with  parts  is  the  sum  of  its  parts  and  any  part  of  an  entity 
exhibits  transitivity.  Also,  Ruben  (1983:  231–32)  and  Uzquiano  (2004;  2018)  argue  that  the  US 
Supreme  Court  has  a  puzzling  structure  and  is  not  a  material  entity .  Alternatively,  Goetz  (2016: 
129–39)  and  Hawley  (2017)  argue  that  any  court  of  law  has  a  puzzling  structure  and  nonetheless 
is  a  material  entity,  which  implies  nonclassical  mereology.  Also,  Goetz  (2014;  2016:  129–39) 
proposes  that  all  legal  entities  and  their  parts  are  material  entities  while  noncontradictory 
paradoxes  of  legal  entities  include  descriptions  for  ubiquitous  government,  coinciding 
governments,  identity  over  time,  and  identical  entities. 
1  Jurisprudence  combines  legal  theory  and  legal  philosophy. 
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 The  rest  of  this  paper  describes  the  no  miracles  argument,  verified  social  systems,  and  a 
proposal  for  a  nonclassical  mereology  and  definitions  for  material  and  entity  that  correspond  to 
the  scientific  descriptions  of  the  verified  social  systems.  2
 
2.  The  No  Miracles  Argument  and  Verified  Social  Systems 
2.1  The  No  Miracles  Argument 
I  appreciate  the  development  of  the  no  miracles  argument,  for  example,  Dawid  and  Hartmann 
(2018).  My  minimalist  position  of  the  no  miracles  argument  introduced  here  says  that  a 
twenty-first-century  scientific  theory  that  has  global  scientific  consensus  is  typically  wholly  or 
mostly  truthful.  The  argument  requires  that  the  scientific  theory  is  based  on  quantitative 
observation  and  rigorous  skepticism.  The  quantitative  observation  and  rigorous  skepticism  from 
the  respective  global  community  of  scientists  typically  indicates  truth  about  the  natural  world 
when  the  global  community  reaches  consensus.  For  example,  basic  scientific  theories  taught  in 
contemporary  science  textbooks  in  all  the  inhabited  continents  are  typically  accurate.  Likewise, 
the  entities  defined  by  the  basic  scientific  theories  typically  refer  to  real  entities.  For  instance,  the 
basics  of  astronomy  taught  in  current  astronomy  textbooks  accurately  refer  to  real  characteristics 
of  real  astronomical  entities,  such  as  planets,  stars,  nebulae,  clusters  of  stars,  galaxies,  and 
clusters  of  galaxies. 
2  I  define  that  material  is  synonymous  with  substantial  and  substance  in  the  context  of 
metaphysics  apart  from  standard  legal  terminology.  I  also  define  that  entity  is  synonymous  with 
object  in  the  context  of  metaphysics  apart  from  standard  legal  terminology. 
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 Scientific  realism  also  implies  bivalence  (Putnam  2015).  For  example,  any  interpretation 
of  scientific  data  can  be  composed  into  a  propositional  statement  or  a  series  of  propositional 
statements  while  any  precise  proposition  has  one  of  two  truth  values,  that  is,  true  or  false.  I 
emphasize  the  need  for  the  precision  of  any  propositional  statement  in  the  context  of  bivalence 
because  any  imprecision  can  cause  confusion.  After  all,  two  researchers  must  agree  on  the 
precise  meaning  of  a  statement  before  they  can  evaluate  the  truth  value  of  the  statement  and 
avoid  talking  past  each  other. 
Furthermore,  conventional  bivalence  implies  that  the  truth  value  true  means  completely 
true .  For  example,  a  complex  statement  could  be  75%  true  yet  the  truth  value  is  false.  This  leads 
to  the  following  definition  for  the  principle  of  bivalence  (PB): 
 
(PB)  Any  precise  propositional  statement  has  one  of  two  truth  values,  that  is,  completely 
true  or  not  completely  true. 
 
Alternatively,  one  could  flip  conventional  bivalence  and  say  that  any  precise  propositional 
statement  has  one  of  two  truth  values,  that  is,  completely  false  or  not  completely  false. 
Nonetheless,  I  stick  with  my  conventional  definition  for  bivalence. 
 
2.2  Definitions  of  Scientific  Entity  and  Material 
I  broadly  define  that  a  scientific  entity  is  anything  defined  by  science.  Also,  PB  implies  that  the 
description  of  any  scientific  entity  is  completely  true  or  not  completely  true.  Similarly,  PB 
implies  the  existence  of  what  I  call  true  scientific  entities  and  false  scientific  entities .  For 
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 example,  a  false  scientific  entity  typically  possesses  quantifiable  phenomena  that  had  not  been 
correctly  interpreted,  while  the  description  of  the  scientific  theory  or  entity  is  not  completely 
true. 
Scientists  develop  hypotheses  about  scientific  entities  and  carefully  test  the  hypotheses 
by  collecting  data,  analyzing  the  data,  and  interpreting  the  results.  Some  data  collection  involves 
controlled  experiments,  that  is,  experiments  that  are  directly  manipulated  by  the  scientists,  but 
controlled  experiments  are  sometimes  impossible  because  of  ethical  standards  or  constraints  in 
technology.  For  example,  astronomy  is  a  natural  science  and  astronomers  rarely  if  ever  perform 
controlled  experiments  while  collecting  astronomical  data. 
Ironically,  some  scientific  entities  are  unobservable  entities .  Unobservable  scientific 
entities  cannot  be  directly  detected  by  current  technology  while  they  nonetheless  exhibit 
quantifiable  effects.  Consider  the  case  of  gravity.  Global  scientific  consensus  says  that  gravity  is 
a  fundamental  interaction  of  physics,  but  no  unanimous  consensus  defines  if  the  structure  of 
gravity  is  a  force  or  a  forceless  interaction  (Goetz  forthcoming:  section  2.5).  For  example, 
Einstein  (1961)  developed  his  theory  of  gravity  called  general  relativity  while  meticulously 
documenting  the  orbit  of  the  planet  Mercury.  His  theory  states  that  gravity  has  no  quantum  fields 
and  is  caused  by  the  forceless  interaction  between  mass  and  relative  spacetime.  However,  the 
majority  of  current  gravitational  physicists  conjecture  the  existence  of  unobservable  gravitational 
force  (Dyson  2012).  The  majority  say  that  Einstein's  theory  of  forceless  gravity  has  no 
nomological  possibility  of  interacting  with  quantum  systems  such  as  photons  and  subatomic 
particles.  They  also  say  that  a  gravitational  force  field  with  zero  mass  coheres  with  quantum 
mechanics  and  Einstein's  field  equations  for  general  relativity.  However,  no  current  or  future 
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 technology  could  directly  observe  gravitational  force  because  of  the  implied  minuscule  scale  and 
extra  dimensions.  In  other  words,  assuming  the  majority  that  says  gravity  is  a  force,  then  the 
observable  effects  of  gravity  are  ubiquitous  while  no  current  or  future  technology  can  possibly 
detect  the  structure  of  gravity.  Moreover,  regardless  if  gravity  is  a  forceless  interaction  or  a  force, 
then  gravity  is  a  fundamental  entity  of  physics  and  an  unobservable  entity.  Likewise, 
unobservable  entities  are  fundamental  to  natural  science. 
Next,  I  dismiss  the  Aristotelian  concept  of  material ,  while  my  definitions  for  material 
and  entity  overlap  each  other.  For  example,  material  includes  anything  that  foremost  derives 
from  the  fundamental  interactions  of  physics  and  the  term  material  refers  to  something  that  is  a 
part  of  an  entity.  Likewise,  an  entity  that  is  part  of  another  entity  is  also  material.  Furthermore, 
my  definitions  of  scientific  entity  and  material  imply  the  existence  of  observable  material  and 
unobservable  material. 
This  paper  applies  the  no  miracles  argument  to  the  quantitative  research  of  social  systems 
in  zoology  and  social  science.  Examples  of  the  research  focus  on  self-organization  and  collective 
behavior  of  social  vertebrates  (Couzin  and  Krause  2003);  complex  group  behavior  among 
primates  (Silk  and  Kappeler  2017);  prehistoric  human  societies  (Ferraro  2012);  and  quantitative 
social  research  methods  focusing  on  contemporary  human  social  systems  (Imai  2018). 
 
2.3  Self-Organized  Vertebrate  Social  Groups 
Social  groups  of  vertebrates  began  to  emerge  over  500  million  years  ago.  Any 
noninstitutionalized  social  group  of  animals  exhibits  quantifiable  self-organization.  The 
self-organization  of  social  groups  is  a  process  where  members  of  an  animal  group  act  together  in 
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 noninstitutionalized  behavior.  Similarly,  self-organization  is  a  process  that  involves  numerous 
interactions  among  local-level  components  of  a  system  that  cause  the  emergence  of  a 
global-level  pattern  in  space  and  time.  In  the  case  of  a  social  group,  the  members  of  the  group  are 
the  local-level  components  of  the  self-organization,  while  the  communication  and  movement  of 
the  members  are  the  numerous  interactions  among  the  local-level  components.  Global  scientific 
consensus  verifies  the  existence  of  the  following  examples  of  self-organized  vertebrate  groups: 
 
1.  The  first  social  vertebrates  were  jawless  fish  that  exhibited  self-organization. 
2.  Self-organized  social  groups  that  move  together  with  coordinated  unity  in  the  same 
direction  include  schools  of  fish,  flocks  of  birds,  and  herds  of  mammals  (Couzin  and 
Krause  2003). 
3.  Human  crowds  exhibit  self-organization  (Couzin  and  Krause  2003). 
 
Also,  collective  behavior  is  a  brief,  excited  state  of  social  self-organization,  such  as  a  flock  of 
birds  that  suddenly  changes  the  direction  of  its  flight. 
 
2.4  Social  Norms  and  Cultural  Norms 
Social  norms  are  standards  of  living  for  a  social  group.  Also,  cultural  norms  are  social  norms  that 
passed  down  from  one  generation  to  the  next.  For  example,  various  primate  groups  exhibit 
cultural  norms  (Silk  and  Kappeler  2017).  Similarly,  global  scientific  consensus  verifies  the 
existence  of  social  norms  and  cultural  norms. 
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 2.5  Legal  Entities 
Most  Neolithic  cultures  developed  into  settled  political  entities  (Ferraro  2012).  Political  entities 
such  as  a  city  or  a  sovereign  state  are  a  type  of  legal  entity,   while  every  settled  political  entity 3
has  a  defined  territory,  a  human  population,  and  a  government. 
All  legal  entities  possess  rights  and  responsibilities  (Deiser  1908;  1909a;  1909b).  The 
three  top  types  of  legal  entities  are  sovereign  political  entities,  natural  persons,  and  juristic 
entities.   For  example,  a  natural  person  is  a  human  with  rights  and  responsibilities;  while  every 4
human  is  a  natural  person,  except  for  past  cases  of  chattel  slavery  which  horrifically  reduced  a 
human  to  a  mere  piece  of  property  with  no  legal  rights.  Also,  types  of  juristic  entities  include 
subnational  entities,   incorporated  public  departments,  private  institutions,  and  private 5
businesses.  Furthermore,  any  sovereign  legal  entity  or  juristic  entity  can  create  a  departmental 
juristic  entity,  which  can  create  a  departmental  juristic  entity,  which  can  create  a  departmental 
juristic  entity.... 
A  primary  right  of  any  legal  entity  is  the  right  to  own  property.  Two  top  types  of  property 
are  tangible  and  intangible.  Tangible  property  is  made  of  matter  or  energy.  Types  of  intangible 
property  include  financial  assets  and  intellectual  property.  Also,  the  documentation  of  a  piece  of 
intangible  property  might  be  tangible,  but  nonetheless  the  property  is  intangible. 
3  The  legal  term  legal  entity  is  synonymous  with  legal  person . 
4  The  legal  term  juristic  entity  is  synonymous  with  juristic  person ,  juridical  entity ,  juridical 
person ,  artificial  entity ,  artificial  person ,  fictitious  entity  and  fictitious  person . 
5  Examples  of  subnational  entities  include  provinces  and  cities. 
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 The  global  consensus  of  anthropologists  verifies  that  some  prehistoric  humans  developed 
political  entities.  Also,  the  major  schools  of  jurisprudence  (that  is,  natural  law  theory,  legal 
positivism,  and  legal  realism)  agree  that  legal  entities,  governments,  political  officials,  and  pieces 
of  property  are  concrete  entities.   The  only  point  of  dispute  is  that  legal  positivism  objects  to  the 6
reality  of  uncodified  political  entities,  such  as  prehistoric  political  entities  and  any  other 
preliterate  political  entities.  Furthermore,  legal  entities  are  analyzed  by  quantitative  research  in 
various  fields  such  as  sociology,  economics,  human  geography,  demography,  political  science, 
anthropology,  and  quantitative  history. 
 
3.  Social  Systems  and  Metaphysics 
3.1  Introduction 
The  sciences  have  never  disputed  the  reality  of  social  systems.  However,  the  field  of  metaphysics 
debates  the  reality  versus  unreality  of  social  systems.  As  mentioned  in  section  1,  Ruben  (1983: 
231–32)  and  Uzquiano  (2004;  2018)  argue  that  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  a  puzzling  structure 
and  is  not  a  material  entity.  Alternatively,  Goetz  (2014;  2016:  129–39)  and  Hawley  (2017)  argue 
that  courts  of  law  have  a  puzzling  structure  and  nonetheless  are  a  material  entity.  Also,  Goetz 
(2014;  2016:  129–39)  proposes  that  legal  entities  and  their  parts  are  material  entities,  while 
noncontradictory  paradoxes  of  legal  entities  include  descriptions  for  identity  over  time, 
ubiquitous  government,  coinciding  governments,  and  identical  entities. 
One  might  wonder  how  a  structure  with  a  puzzling  description  could  be  a  material 
structure  or  how  a  paradox  can  be  noncontradictory.  However,  Quine  (1976:  1–18)  defines  that  a 
6  The  major  schools  of  jurisprudence  are  also  the  major  schools  of  legal  philosophy. 
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 paradox  is  an  apparently  successful  argument  that  has  a  concluding  statement  that  seems 
contradictory  or  absurd.  Rigorous  analysis  of  the  argument  can  resolve  the  paradox  in  two 
possible  ways.  One,  careful  analysis  reveals  that  the  argument  is  fallacious.  Two,  careful  analysis 
(1)  reveals  that  the  conclusion  is  actually  true  and  (2)  explains  away  the  deceptive  appearances. 
Also,  Goetz  describes  noncontradictory  paradoxes : 
 
One  may  only  partially  comprehend  a  [noncontradictory]  paradox  because  of  limited 
information.  Or  debaters  may  defend  contradictory  positions.  Or  a  set  of  legal  codes  may 
contain  contradictions  subject  to  amendment  or  termination.  Regardless,  there  are  no 
absolute  contradictions.  (Goetz  2014:  36) 
 
I  define  that  a  noncontradictory  paradox  or  a  coherent  puzzle  is  a  description  of  a  thing  that 
looks  contradictory  at  some  level  while  the  description  has  no  absolute  contradiction.  Possible 
reasons  that  they  look  contradictory  at  some  level  include  the  following:  one,  the  paradoxical 
description  lacks  precision;  two,  members  of  the  audience  of  the  noncontradictory  paradox  need 
more  background  on  the  complex  content  of  the  paradox. 
Goetz  (2016:  129–39)  also  demonstrates  that  all  noncontradictory  paradoxes  of  legal 
entities  and  their  parts  cohere  with  a  precisely  stated  law  of  absolute  identity  (LAI): 
 
(LAI)  Anything  is  absolutely  identical  to  itself  and  nothing  else  at  any  respective  point  of 
time. 
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 Also,  Goetz  (2014:  36;  forthcoming:  section  2.5.2)  supports  that  noncontradictory  paradoxes 
cohere  with  the  law  of  non-contradiction  (LNC): 
 
(LNC)  There  are  no  absolute  contradictions. 
 
For  example,  noncontradictory  paradoxes  that  cohere  with  the  LNC  include  a  bivalent 
interpretation  of  the  notorious  uncertainty  principle  in  quantum  mechanics  (de  Ronde, 
Domenech,  and  Freytes  no  date;  Goetz  forthcoming:  section  2.5.2). 
The  following  paradoxes  cohere  with  LAI,  LNC,  and  the  global  consensus  of 
jurisprudence  and  other  related  social  sciences: 
 
J1.  A  buyer  can  purchase  a  piece  of  tangible  property  with  a  piece  of  intangible  property, 
such  as  paper  currency. 
J2.  International  artisan  copyright  law  distinguishes  the  tangible  material  of  a  statue  from 
the  intangible  design  of  the  statue. 
J3.  An  automobile  with  a  vehicle  identity  number  (VIN)  can  have  all  of  it  parts  replaced 
an  indefinite  number  of  times,  including  the  VIN  label,  while  the  VIN  does  not  change. 
Also,  all  of  the  original  parts  of  the  automobile  could  be  reassembled  into  a  working 
automobile  that  would  require  a  new  VIN  for  legal  registration  (Goetz  2014:  39). 
J4.  A  government  of  a  political  entity  is  made  of  political  officials  and  legal  rights  while 
the  government  has  authority  over  the  entire  territory  and  population  of  the  political 
entity  (Goetz  2014:  41). 
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 J5.  A  governmental  entity  can  create  a  departmental  entity  while  both  entities  have 
authority  over  the  same  territory  and  population  (Goetz  2014:  41). 
J6.  A  sole  proprietorship  is  an  unincorporated  business  while  a  natural  person  is  the  sole 
proprietor  who  is  inseparable  from  the  business.  The  natural  person  is  the  authority  of  the 
business  and  has  unlimited  liability  for  all  business  losses  (Goetz  2014:  42–46;  2016: 
129–30). 
J7.  A  general  partnership  is  an  unincorporated  business  while  multiple  natural  persons  are 
the  proprietors  called  general  partners  who  are  inseparable  from  the  business.  Each 
general  partner  is  the  authority  of  the  business  and  has  unlimited  liability  for  all  business 
losses  (Goetz  2014:  42–46;  2016:  133). 
J8.  A  typical  political  official  is  a  natural  person  with  inseparable  governmental  authority 
while  the  political  official  and  the  natural  person  are  two  distinct  concrete  entities  (Goetz 
2014:  42;  2016:  129–39). 
J9.  A  natural  person  can  simultaneously  be  multiple  political  officials.  For  example, 
Lepidus  was  simultaneously  a  natural  person,  the  pontifex  maximus,  and  an  absolute 
triumvir  (Goetz  2016:  136). 
J10.  An  absolute  coregency  is  a  single  rulership  while  multiple  joint  monarchs  each 
possess  the  same  absolute  authority  (Goetz  2014:  42–46;  2016:  129–39). 
 
Some  readers  may  feel  that  the  above  legal  examples  of  noncontradictory  paradoxes  are  in  no 
way  noncontradictory,  and  that  I  merely  defended  Ruben's  (1983:  231–32)  and  Uzquiano's 
(2004;  2018)  proposals  which  say  that  no  court  of  law  is  a  material  entity.  However,  I  now 
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 defend  the  logic  of  social  systems  which  includes  the  reality  of  legal  entities  and  their  parts.  The 
first  step  in  my  defense  is  to  describe  the  science  and  metaphysics  of  self-organized  social 
groups. 
 
3.2  The  Science  and  Metaphysics  of  Self-Organized  Social  Groups 
I  previously  noted  that  vertebrate  social  groups  began  to  emerge  over  500  million  years  ago,  that 
is,  social  groups  of  the  first  jawless  fish.  Any  social  group  of  fish  is  called  a  shoal  while  any 
shoal  of  fish  that  swims  together  in  unified  direction  is  also  called  a  school .  For  example,  schools 
of  herring  began  to  emerge  over  50  million  years  ago.  I  note  the  phenomenon  of  fish  schools 
because  they  are  obvious  to  the  naked  eye  when  the  water  is  clear;  an  experienced  radar 
technician  cannot  easily  distinguish  a  fish  school  from  a  similar-sized  whale  or  submarine;  and 
the  mathematics  of  fish  school  behavior  has  been  carefully  analyzed  and  documented.  That  said, 
metaphysicians  debate  if  a  self-organized  social  group  is  a  material  entity  or  not  a  material  entity. 
Consider  the  self-organization  and  schools  of  fish  described  in  section  2.3. 
Self-organization  is  a  process  that  involves  numerous  interactions  among  local-level  components 
of  a  system  that  cause  the  emergence  of  a  global-level  pattern  in  space  and  time.  In  the  case  of  a 
fish  school,  the  local-level  components  are  individual  fish.  Also,  the  process  of  the  fish 
interaction  causes  a  global-level  pattern  that  is  a  fish  school,  while  the  fish  school  is  a  scientific 
entity.  The  respective  process  and  entity  imply  the  following  proposition,  that  is,  proposition  1: 
 
Proposition  1 :  Any  process  of  organization  implies  the  existence  of  an  organized  entity 
and  vice  versa. 
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 Proposition  1  is  coherent  and  nonetheless  flouts  classical  mereology  which  implies  that  an 
emergent  entity  cannot  have  parts  while  any  self-organized  entity  has  components.  Likewise, 
proposition  1  implies  a  nonclassical  mereology  while  Seibt  (2014)  and  Hawley  (2017)  also 
propose  nonclassical  mereologies.  For  example,  Seibt  proposes  a  process  philosophy  of 
mereology  for  the  process  of  self-organization  which  rejects  real  Aristotelian  concepts  of 
substances  and  entities  and  altogether  rejects  the  existence  of  any  types  of  substances  and 
entities.  I  appreciate  Seibt's  rejection  of  real  Aristotelian  substances  and  entities,  but  I  propose 
the  existence  of  entities  that  correspond  to  verified  scientific  entities.  For  instance,  a  fish  school 
is  a  dynamic  entity  that  is  always  in  the  process  of  self-organization. 
One  might  object  to  proposition  1  while  saying  that  a  fish  school  is  noncontiguous  and 
likewise  not  a  real  entity.  However,  fish  in  a  school  are  connected  by  communication,  while  the 
interaction  of  the  fish  in  the  school  depends  on  the  communication.  Likewise,  a  fish  school  is 
composed  of  (1)  multiple  fish  that  are  attracted  to  each  other  and  (2)  communication  between  the 
fish.  The  fish  and  the  communication  combine  into  a  contiguous  entity  that  is  the  fish  school. 
Also,  communication  is  a  material  phenomenon  which  is  subject  to  scientific  research.  Similarly, 
a  social  group  is  a  contagious  material  entity  composed  of  members  who  are  attracted  to  each 
other  and  observable  communication  between  the  members. 
 
3.3  The  Science  and  Metaphysics  of  Social  Norms 
As  previously  noted,  social  norms  are  standards  of  living  for  a  social  group.  Also,  zoologists  and 
social  scientists  collect  quantifiable  data  about  social  norms.  Furthermore,  if  a  social  norm 
spontaneously  emerges,  then  it  is  a  product  of  self-organization  and  called  a  custom . 
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 Alternatively,  other  social  norms  emerge  from  the  governments  of  institutions.  Either  way, 
communication  is  a  primary  element  of  any  social  norm.  Also,  a  social  norm  is  a  contiguous 
material  entity  based  on  an  observable  communication  system  described  in  section  3.2.  For 
example,  any  social  norm  is  composed  of  group  members  and  communication  between  the 
members. 
 
3.4  The  Science  and  Metaphysics  of  Legal  Entities 
3.4.1  Introduction 
Courts  of  law  do  not  defend  their  own  existence.  Any  defense  lawyer  or  defendant  would  face 
charges  of  contempt  if  they  would  argue  that  their  trial  is  meaningless  because  there  are  no  real 
legal  entities  or  no  facts  about  the  past.  Alternatively,  the  'International  Court  of  Philosophers' 
questions  the  existence  of  everything. 
Consider  various  legal  philosophies.  Aristotle  (350  BCE)  supported  the  reality  of  political 
entities,  political  officials,  citizens,  and  property,  but  he  never  described  their  substance.  Proto 
legal  positivist  Hobbes  (1651)  proposed  that  political  entities  are  artificial  entities  formed  by 
group  consent.  Legal  realist  Moore  (1923)  proposed  that  political  entities  are  formed  by 
long-lasting  group  habits.  Natural  law  theorist  Goetz  (2014;  2016)  proposed  that  political  entities 
emerged  from  natural  rights  and  the  natural  organization  of  human  groups.  Also,  section  2.5 
notes  that  the  major  schools  of  jurisprudence  agree  that  political  entities  are  concrete  entities. 
Hobbes  referred  to  a  sovereign  state  as  an  artificial  person.  However,  contemporary 
jurisprudence  limits  the  term  artificial  person  and  all  its  synonyms  listed  in  footnote  4  to  legal 
entities  other  than  a  sovereign  state  or  a  natural  person.  For  example,  artificial  persons  include 
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 subnational  entities,  incorporated  public  departments,  private  institutions,  and  private  businesses. 
Setting  aside  legal  terminology,  I  propose  that  any  human  social  norm  and  anything  defined  by 
law  is  artificial  because  it  is  made  by  humans.  Also,  anything  defined  by  law  is  what  I  call  a 
jurisprudential  entity .  Similarly,  I  propose  that  any  human  social  norms  and  any  jurisprudential 
entity  is  a  social  artifact  because  it  is  made  by  humans,  for  instance,  proposition  2: 
 
Proposition  2 :  Any  human  social  norm  or  any  jurisprudential  entity  is  a  social  artifact. 
 
Also,  this  subsection  focuses  on  legal  entities,  so  I  trim  proposition  2  to  make  proposition  3: 
 
Proposition  3 :  Any  jurisprudential  entity  is  a  social  artifact. 
 
Furthermore,  I  propose  that  any  social  artifact  is  a  material  entity,  for  example,  proposition  4: 
 
Proposition  4 :  Any  social  artifact  is  a  material  entity. 
 
Moreover,  since  this  subsection  focuses  on  legal  entities,  I  modify  proposition  4  to  make 
proposition  5: 
 
Proposition  5:  Any  jurisprudential  entity  is  a  material  entity. 
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 My  analysis  of  proposition  5  begins  by  analyzing  the  composition  of  a  sovereign  political  entity. 
Consider  the  Convention  on  Rights  and  Duties  of  States  (1933),  Article  1.  It  says  that  a 
sovereign  state  as  a  person  of  international  law  should  possess  the  following  qualifications:  a 
permanent  population,  a  defined  territory,  a  government,  and  the  capacity  to  enter  into  relations 
with  the  other  states.  First,  the  permanent  population  and  the  defined  territory  are  clearly  tangible 
entities.  Second,  the  government  is  ruled  by  laws  and  has  one  or  more  members  of  the 
population,  while  the  laws  are  based  on  an  observable  communication  system.  Third,  the 
government's  capacity  to  enter  into  relations  with  other  states  is  also  based  on  an  observable 
communication  system.  Fourth,  the  property  owned  by  a  sovereign  state  is  typically  a 
combination  of  tangible  property  and  intangible  property. 
The  above  description  implies  that  a  sovereign  state  is  an  entity  composed  of  observable 
jurisprudential  entities  and  unobservable  jurisprudential  entities.  Similarly,  a  sovereign  state  is 
composed  of  observable  material  and  unobservable  material.  The  population,  territory,  members 
of  the  government,  communication  system,  and  tangible  property  are  the  observable  entities.  The 
laws  and  the  intangible  property  are  the  unobservable  entities.  The  observable  entities  are 
evidently  straight  forward  while  the  unobservable  entities  need  a  clear  explanation. 
The  institution  of  laws  began  to  emerge  from  Neolithic  social  norms  while  verified 
sovereign  political  entities  began  to  emerge  around  4000  BCE.  The  laws  define  the  rights  and 
responsibilities  of  legal  entities,  that  is,  the  sovereign  state,  the  natural  persons,  and  any  juristic 
entities.  For  example,  legal  rights  permeate  the  territory  and  population  of  any  political  entity. 
Also,  the  communication  of  the  legal  rights  is  observable,  but  the  permeation  of  the  legal  rights 
is  unobservable. 
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 Next,  intangible  property  is  a  social  norm.  Noncontradictory  paradox  J1  in  section  3.1 
describes  that  intangible  property  is  sometimes  used  to  purchase  tangible  property.  This  implies 
cases  where  intangible  property  and  tangible  property  have  equal  values.  For  example,  trade 
between  humans  is  a  social  norm  that  emerged  in  prehistory  while  the  trade  of  grain  loans 
eventually  emerged  around  2000  BCE.  The  loans  involved  the  tangible  property  of  grain  and  the 
intangible  property  of  the  loan  contract.  The  communication  of  the  loan  contract  is  observable, 
but  the  value  of  the  contract  is  otherwise  unobservable  while  legal  terminology  says  the  value  is 
intangible. 
Laws  and  intangible  property  are  a  metaphysical  curiosities.  They  are  beyond  direct 
observation  while  their  supporting  communication  system  and  effects  are  subjects  of  quantitative 
science.  Also,  consider  the  following: 
 
Research  of  past  and  current  phenomena  indicates  strong  evidence  that  legal  persons 
sometimes  generate  enormous  force.  Great  nations  rise  and  fall.  Government  officials 
declare  war  and  armies  fight  with  tangible  weapons.  Legal  persons  buy  and  sell  property. 
Universities  grant  academic  degrees.  A  cartoon  character  is  intangible  property  that 
generates  multibillions  of  US  dollars  per  year.  Banks  and  law  enforcement  foreclose 
mortgages  of  family  residences.  Governments  and  economies  around  the  world  operate 
according  to  the  logic  of  law.  (Goetz  2014:  36;  2016:  132–33) 
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 3.4.2  The  unobservable  material  of  law 
Laws  permeate  every  legal  entity  and  piece  of  property  while  quantitative  science  and  history 
indicate  the  reality  of  laws.  I  propose  that  laws  are  real  and  a  product  of  synergy ,  that  is,  the 
interaction  of  two  or  more  objects  that  produce  a  combined  effect  greater  than  the  sum  of  the 
separate  effects.  For  example,  self-organization  exemplifies  synergy,  while  I  previously 
described  scientifically  verified  evidence  of  self-organized  social  groups  and  social  norms. 
However,  social  science  defines  that  self-organization  is  limited  to  noninstitutionalized  entities. 
For  example,  a  social  scientist  can  properly  say  that  the  first  laws  were  social  norms  that 
emerged  from  self-organized  social  norms.  Nevertheless,  a  social  scientist  would  break 
convention  if  they  say  that  laws  are  self-organized.  Given  the  restrictions  of  this  convention,  I 
describe  that  law  is  synergistic  material  formed  by  humans. 
Law  is  extraordinarily  flexible  while  it  permeates  all  legal  entities  and  pieces  of  property. 
For  example,  legal  rights  permeate  all  residents  of  a  political  entity.  Also,  the  flexibility  of 
standard  jurisprudence  supports  the  noncontradictory  paradoxes  J1–10  in  section  3.1.  Next, 
sections  3.4.3–6  describe  respective  paradoxes  of  jurisprudential  identity. 
 
3.4.3  Jurisprudential  material  constitution 
A  notable  puzzle  of  material  constitution  involves  a  lump  of  material  that  was  fashioned  into  a 
statue  (Wasserman  2018).  For  example,  a  lump  of  gold  is  formed  into  a  statue  named  Jupiter . 
Some  argue  that  the  lump  and  Jupiter  are  two  different  material  entities  that  coincide  at  the  same 
space  and  time,  while  others  argue  that  the  lump  made  into  Jupiter  is  one  material  entity.  Points 
in  favor  of  two  different  entities  include  the  following:  (1)  the  lump  existed  before  Jupiter;  (2) 
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 melting  Jupiter  would  terminate  Jupiter  and  leave  the  lump  intact;  and  (3)  hollowing  out 
nonessential  gold  from  Jupiter  and  selling  the  removed  gold  would  divide  the  lump  into  two 
pieces  of  property  and  leave  Jupiter  intact.  Alternatively,  the  argument  for  the  lump  and  Jupiter 
being  one  entity  focuses  on  the  position  that  constitution  is  identity  which  is  based  on  the 
grounds  that  two  distinct  entities  cannot  occupy  the  same  place  at  the  same  time. 
I  appreciate  these  points  while  I  consider  another  angle.  First,  particle  physics  indicates 
that  no  two  particles  of  matter  can  occupy  the  same  place  at  the  same  time,  but  nonetheless 
multiple  photons  can  occupy  the  same  place  at  the  same  time.  Likewise,  the  particle  physics  of 
photons  refutes  the  grounds  for  constitution  is  identity.  Second,  J2  implies  that  international 
artisan  copyright  law  distinguishes  the  tangible  material  of  Jupiter  from  the  intangible  design  of 
Jupiter.  For  example,  destroying  the  tangible  material  of  Jupiter  would  not  damage  the  intangible 
design  of  Jupiter. 
In  the  context  of  my  definitions  observable  material  and  unobservable  material ,  the  lump 
is  an  observable  entity  while  the  design  of  Jupiter  is  an  unobservable  entity.  Likewise,  Jupiter  is 
the  combination  of  two  entities,  that  is,  tangible  lump  and  the  design  of  Jupiter.  
 
3.4.4  Jurisprudential  identity  over  time 
The  metaphysics  of  identity  over  time  and  consequential  change  is  called  persistence  or 
diachronic  identity .  Diachronic  identity  has  been  debated  since  ancient  history.  For  example, 
Plutarch  (1914:  49–51 )  described  the  ancient  philosophical  debate  about  the  legendary  ship  of 
Theseus.  Theseus  was  the  mythical  founder  and  king  of  Athens,  while  the  Athenians  preserved 
Theseus's  ship  in  the  Athenian  harbor  by  replacing  the  ship's  decayed  planks  of  wood  with  newer 
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 and  stronger  planks.  Eventually,  the  Athenians  replaced  every  tangible  piece  of  the  ship.  Ancient 
philosophers  debated  when  theorizing  if  the  ship  with  replacement  parts  was  the  same  ship. 
Some  said  it  was  the  same  ship  while  others  said  it  was  a  different  ship. 
Hobbes  (1656:  84–85)  defended  that  the  ship  was  no  longer  Theseus's  ship  while 
enhancing  the  scenario  with  a  custodian  who  collected  all  of  the  original  worn  pieces  and 
reassembled  them  into  a  ship  with  the  same  design.  This  resulted  in  two  ships  with  the  same 
design  while  the  original  parts  were  reassembled  and  located  elsewhere.  However,  Goetz  (2014: 
38–39)  concludes  that  international  custom  with  ancient  origins  implies  that  the  ship  was 
movable  property  owned  by  the  city  of  Athens.   This  means  that  the  identity  of  Theseus's  ship  in 7
the  Athenian  harbor  remained  the  same  regardless  of  how  many  times  all  of  the  tangible  pieces 
were  replaced  and  then  reassembled  by  the  Hobbesian  custodian  into  an  indefinite  number  of 
ships  with  the  same  design. 
Also,  Goetz  compares  Theseus's  ship  and  the  Hobbesian  custodian  to  a  contemporary 
automobile  with  a  vehicle  identification  number  (VIN).  The  scenario  follows: 
 
Despite  any  amount  of  vehicle  repair  using  replacement  auto  parts,  the  VIN  remains  the 
same  even  if  the  VIN  label  needs  replacement.  Likewise,  if  a  mechanic  replaces  all 
[tangible]  parts  of  a  respective  automobile,  the  VIN  remains  the  same.  Also,  if  the 
mechanic  later  reassembles  the  original  auto  parts  into  a  vehicle  for  use  on  public  roads, 
7  The  terms  movable  property  and  personal  property  are  equivalent  while  civil  law  systems  use 
the  former  and  common  law  systems  use  the  latter.  The  terms  refer  to  any  property  other  than 
real  estate. 
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 then  the  second  vehicle  made  from  the  original  auto  parts  needs  its  own  new  VIN.  (Goetz 
2014:  39) 
 
I  agree  with  these  extraordinary  cases  of  diachronic  identity  which  are  based  on  standard 
jurisprudence.  Also,  I  propose  that  all  diachronic  identity  results  from  material  phenomena  that  I 
call  a  causal  chain  of  persistence .  Furthermore,  I  agree  with  Goetz  (2014:  37 – 40;  2016:  137 – 38) 
that  legal  entities  and  pieces  of  property  with  a  title  exhibit  essential  changes  and  nonessential 
changes,  while  I  nonetheless  dismiss  the  Aristotelian  concepts  of  material  and  entity.  Next,  I 
preface  my  description  of  the  changes  and  causal  chains  by  describing  Locke  on  persistence. 
Locke  famously  defended  persistence  for  personal  identity  and  other  natural  phenomena 
(Gordon-Roth  2019).  He  began  by  defining  individuation  and  what  some  call  the  place-time-kind 
principle .  The  place-time-kind  principle  proposes  that  (1)  no  two  things  of  the  same  kind  can  be 
in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time  and  (2)  no  individual  can  be  in  two  different  places  at  the 
same  time.  Locke  applied  the  place-time-kind  principle  to  natural  objects  such  as  atoms,  masses 
of  matter,  plants,  animals,  and  humans.  Then,  Locke  described  consciousness  as  the  sole  element 
of  persistence  for  the  personal  identity  of  a  human  by  detailing  hypothetical  scenarios.  Three  of 
the  scenarios  follow.  First,  one  personal  consciousness  switches  from  one  body  to  another  body 
while  persistence  of  personal  identity  is  unobstructed  by  the  consciousness  switching  between 
bodies.  Second,  one  personal  consciousness  switches  from  one  immaterial  soul  to  another 
immaterial  soul  while  persistence  of  personal  identity  is  unobstructed  by  the  consciousness 
switching  between  souls.  Third,  two  personal  consciousnesses  alternate  in  the  same  body  while 
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 there  are  two  personal  identities  despite  one  body.  All  in  all,  Locke  defends  that  persistence  of 
consciousness  and  nothing  else  causes  persistence  of  personal  identity. 
I  appreciate  Locke's  17th-century  position  of  persistence.  For  example,  it  coheres  with 
the  diachronic  identity  of  Thesus's  ship  and  Goetz's  automobile.  Also,  it  coheres  with  the  particle 
physics  of  matter  which,  as  I  described  earlier,  says  that  two  or  more  particles  of  matter  cannot 
exist  at  the  same  place  and  time.  However,  problems  with  the  place-time-kind  principle  follow. 
First,  as  described  earlier,  the  particle  physics  of  photons  indicates  that  multiple  photons  can 
exist  at  the  same  place  and  time.  Second,  quantum  mechanics  indicates  that  an  entangled  system 
can  exist  at  two  different  places  at  the  same  time.  Third,  noncontradictory  paradox  J5  says  that 
multiple  legal  entities  such  as  departments  can  exist  at  the  same  place  and  time.  Fourth, 
noncontradictory  paradoxes  J6–10  are  examples  of  identical  entities  that  will  be  detailed  in 
section  3.4.5.  Given  these  exceptions  to  the  place-time-kind  principle,  I  begin  to  define 
individuation  with  LAI  defined  in  section  3.1,  that  is,  "Anything  is  absolutely  identical  to  itself 
and  nothing  else  at  any  respective  point  of  time." 
Now,  I  describe  the  changes,  causal  chains,  and  diachronic  identity  of  legal  entities.  First, 
any  essential  change  of  a  legal  entity  causes  the  origination  or  termination  of  the  legal  entity. 
Second,  any  nonessential  change  does  not  cause  the  origination  or  termination  of  the  legal  entity. 
Likewise,  legal  entities  persist  through  nonessential  changes.  Third,  the  persistence  through 
nonessential  changes  is  caused  by  causal  chains. 
Causal  chains  of  persistence  are  ubiquitous  in  nature.  For  example,  fundamental 
interactions  permeate  the  spacetime  universe  and  cause  the  persistence  of  particles  (Goetz 
forthcoming:  section  2.5).  Also,  the  interdisciplinary  science  of  synergetics  indicates  the 
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 diversity  and  ubiquity  of  self-organization  in  nature  and  society  (Haken  1974–;  2008),  while  the 
self-organization  implies  the  persistence  of  self-organized  entities.  Likewise,  in  many  ways, 
natural  interactions  cause  organization  and  persistence. 
Some  causal  chains  of  persistence  are  unclear.  For  example,  two  flocks  of  birds  can  unite 
into  one  larger  flock  or  one  flock  can  divide  into  two  smaller  flocks,  while  pinpointing  the  exact 
time  of  the  respective  unification  or  division  is  disputable.  Also,  the  origination  or  termination  of 
a  legal  entity  is  typically  clear,  but  wars  or  legal  action  can  cause  disputes  about  the  identity  of 
some  legal  entities.  In  the  rest  of  this  third-level  section,  I  focus  on  the  diachronic  identity  of 
undisputed  legal  entities  and  pieces  of  property  with  a  title. 
I  start  with  describing  essential  changes  of  legal  entities.  First,  essential  changes  of 
sovereign  legal  entities  are  caused  by  agreements  and  wars  (Goetz  2014:  38).  For  example,  on 
September  21,  1792,  the  Legislative  Assembly  terminated  the  Kingdom  of  France.  Second, 
essential  changes  of  natural  persons  are  caused  by  birth  and  death  (Goetz  2014:  37).  Third, 
essential  changes  of  juristic  entities  are  caused  by  legislation  and  other  agreements. 
Any  amount  of  tangible  or  intangible  change  to  a  legal  entity  that  does  not  terminate  the 
entity  is  a  nonessential  change.  Likewise,  the  entity  persists  through  the  time  and  change. 
Also,  a  legal  entity  can  create  another  legal  entity.  In  this  case,  the  creation  of  the  legal 
entity  is  nonessential  to  the  original  legal  entity  and  nonetheless  essential  to  the  latter  legal  entity. 
In  the  case  of  formula  logic,  diachronic  identity  implies  that  an  entity  persists  without  the 
persistence  of  absolute  identicalness.  This  can  be  expressed  in  the  formula  for  relative  identity 
(RI)  introduced  by  Geach  (1967;  1969;  1977:  72–81): 
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 (RI)  x  and  y  are  the  same  F ,  but  x  and  y  are  different  G s. 
 
RI  implies  the  sameness  of  x  and  F  and  the  sameness  of  y  and  F ;  the  sameness  does  not  imply 
transitivity  because  x  and  y  are  different  from  each  other.  These  parts  of  RI  cohere  with  Locke's 
position  of  personal  identity  and  the  standard  jurisprudential  position  of  diachronic  identity.  For 
example,  F  persists  from  time(0)  to  time(1)  while  x  is  the  same  as  the  properties  of  F  at  time(0) 
and  y  is  the  same  as  the  properties  of  F  at  time(1).  However,  Geach  also  proposes  that  RI  implies 
the  anti-realism  of  all  identicalness.  In  other  words,  Geach  implies  that  x  is  not  identical  to  x ;  y  is 
not  identical  to  y ;  et  cetera.  Alternatively,  some  hold  to  the  reality  of  identicalness  and  use  of  the 
RI  formula  (Gupta  1980;  van  Inwagen  1988;  Goetz  2014;  2016). 
Rea  (2003)  distinguished  between  Geach's  RI  and  van  Inwagen's  RI  by  respectively 
calling  them  pure  RI  and  impure  RI  because  Geach's  RI  contains  no  elements  of  numerical 
identity  (NI)  while  van  Inwagen's  RI  contains  elements  of  NI.  Also,  there  are  different  ways  to 
combine  NI  and  RI.  For  example,  Goetz  (2016:  134–39)  combines  LAI  and  RI  while  describing 
the  standard  jurisprudential  position  of  identity.  Furthermore,  Goetz  (2016:  137)  notes  that  his 
impure  RI  could  also  be  called  impure  NI  while  the  term  pure  NI  refers  to  absolute  identity  and 
absolute  identicalness.  Instead,  I  refer  to  the  combination  of  LAI  and  RI  by  defining  impure 
identity  ( II ): 
 
(II)   x  is  absolutely  identical  to  x ;  y  is  absolutely  identical  to  y ;  x  is  identical  to  y  and 
symmetrically  vice  versa  while  x  and  y  lack  absolute  identicalness  and  absolute 
transitivity. 
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 In  other  words,  II  refers  to  the  impure  identicalness  of  x  and  y .  For  example,  F  persists  from 
time(0)  to  time(1)  while  x  is  absolutely  identical  to  F  at  time(0)  and  y  is  absolutely  identical  to  F 
at  time(1);  x  is  impurely  identical  to  y  and  vice  versa  while  they  are  separated  by  a  time  interval; 
and  x  and  y  are  different  compositions  because  of  F 's  changes  between  time(0)  and  time(1).  In 
this  case,  II  models  diachronic  identity  which  is  ubiquitous  in  standard  jurisprudence. 
 
3.4.5  Special  cases  of  synchronic  impure  identity  (II) 
The  most  controversial  cases  of  jurisprudential  identity  involve  proprietors  and  political  officials. 
I  summarized  them  in  J6–10.  Here,  I  begin  by  describing  proprietors  and  respective  natural 
persons  summarized  in  J6–7. 
Every  living  human  is  a  natural  person,  that  is,  a  legal  entity.  The  only  exceptions  were  in 
the  past  when  horrific  laws  permitted  the  enslavement  of  some  humans  which  reduced  them  to 
mere  pieces  of  tangible  property  with  no  legal  rights.  Considering  the  potential  absence  of  legal 
rights  helps  one  to  understand  legal  rights  and  their  implications  for  identity.  For  example,  a 
living  human  is  inseparable  from  their  legal  rights  and  responsibilities.  This  implies  that  a  human 
is  inseparable  from  their  natural  personality.  Also,  if  a  natural  person  becomes  a  sole  proprietor 
while  starting  a  sole  proprietorship,  then  the  natural  person  is  inseparable  from  the 
proprietorship.  For  example,  standard  jurisprudence  implies  that  the  natural  person  has  unlimited 
liability  for  the  proprietorship  and  is  the  entire  authority  of  the  proprietorship.  Likewise,  the 
natural  person  is  the  same  as  the  proprietorship.  Furthermore,  a  general  partnership  is  a 
proprietorship  that  has  multiple  natural  persons  who  are  the  proprietors  called  general  partners . 
In  this  case,  each  general  partner  is  a  natural  person  who  is  inseparable  from  the  partnership 
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 while  each  has  unlimited  liability  for  the  partnership  and  is  the  entire  authority  of  the  partnership. 
Similarly,  each  general  partner  is  the  same  as  the  partnership. 
Moreover,  consider  the  differences  between  proprietorships  and  limited  companies.  Sole 
proprietorships  and  general  partnerships  originated  from  ancient  customs  while  a  respective 
business  owner  possesses  unlimited  liability  for  the  business.  Alternatively,  limited  companies 
such  as  business  corporations  and  limited  liability  companies  (LLC)  originate  from  statutory 
laws  in  modern  history  while  the  laws  artificially  separate  business  owners  from  their  businesses 
and  limit  the  liability  of  the  owners. 
The  sameness  of  a  natural  person  and  a  proprietorship  exemplifies  what  I  call  synchronic 
II .  Synchronic  II  refers  to  the  simultaneous  impure  identicalness  of  two  entities.  For  example,  a 
natural  person  who  is  a  sole  proprietor  is  identical  to  the  sole  proprietorship  and  vice  versa.  Also, 
each  general  partner  of  a  general  partnership  is  identical  to  the  general  partnership  and  vice 
versa.  However,  the  identicalness  of  a  natural  person  and  a  proprietorship  is  impure  because  they 
lack  absolute  identicalness  and  absolute  transitivity.  For  instance,  a  general  partnership 
epitomizes  synchronic  II  because  each  general  partner  is  identical  to  the  partnership  and  vice 
versa  while  absolute  transitivity  does  not  exist  between  each  general  partner  and  the  partnership. 
Other  cases  of  synchronic  II  involve  natural  persons  and  political  officials  described  in 
J8–10.  Comparable  to  proprietors,  a  natural  person  who  is  a  political  official  is  inseparable  from 
their  political  office.  Also,  I  categorize  that  an  absolute  ruler  is  a  public  official. 
Consider  the  example  of  Lepidus.  He  was  pontifex  maximus  from  44  BCE  to  14  BCE 
and  a  triumvir  from  43  BCE  to  36  BCE.  During  part  of  his  life,  he  was  simultaneously  a  natural 
person,  the  pontifex  maximus,  and  a  triumvir.  Likewise,  during  a  period  of  time,  Lepidus  was 
27 
 identical  to  the  pontifex  maximus;  Lepidus  was  identical  to  the  triumvir;  and  the  natural  person, 
the  pontifex  maximus,  and  the  triumvir  were  three  different  concrete  entities. 
Next,  consider  absolute  coregencies  that  formed  in  ancient  Egypt,  Israel,  Judah,  and 
Rome,  and  medieval  Byzantine.  An  absolute  coregency  is  a  single  rulership  while  multiple  joint 
monarchs  each  possess  the  same  absolute  authority.  Other  types  of  co-rulership  such  as  a  diarchy 
involve  formal  division  between  the  corulers  while  absolute  coregencies  are  undivided.  For 
example,  the  Roman  Senate  in  44  BCE  appointed  Octavian,  Lepidus,  and  Antony  with  absolute 
authority  to  rule  Rome  while  their  only  limitation  of  authority  was  a  term  limit.  They  were  an 
absolute  triumvirate  with  no  formal  division  while  each  triumvir  was  inseparable  from  the 
triumvirate. 
The  triumvirs  and  triumvirate  epitomize  synchronic  II.  Octavian,  Lepidus,  and  Antony 
were  three  natural  persons  while  each  was  impurely  identical  to  the  absolute  triumvirate  and  vice 
versa. 
Furthermore,  consider  the  parallels  between  proprietors  and  public  officials.  For  example, 
one  human  combined  with  unobservable  jurisprudential  material  can  be  simultaneously  impurely 
identical  to  each  of  the  following:  (1)  a  natural  person  and  a  proprietorship  and  (2)  a  natural 
person  and  one  or  more  political  offices.  Also,  one  general  partnership  can  be  simultaneously 
impurely  identical  to  unobservable  jurisprudential  material  combined  with  each  of  the  general 
partners  and  one  coregency  can  simultaneously  be  impurely  identical  to  unobservable 
jurisprudential  material  combined  with  each  of  the  joint  monarchs. 
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 3.4.6  Leibniz's  Law 
Consider  Leibniz's  Law  (LL): 
 
(LL)  for  every  property  F ,  entity  x  has  F  if  and  only  if  entity  y  has  F ,  then  x  is  identical  to 
y . 
 
LL  is  the  standard  account  of  identity  and  implies  that  x  is  identical  to  y  only  when  x  and  y 
possess  all  the  same  properties.  However,  LL  faces  major  problems  with  diachronic  identity  and 
synchronic  II. 
Deutsch  and  Garbacz  (2018:  section  2.1)  note  that  some  proponents  of  LL  creatively 
support  diachronic  identity  while  other  proponents  of  LL  creatively  avoid  the  reality  of 
diachronic  identity.  For  example,  consider  two  photos  of  a  dog  named  Oscar.  Photo  A  shows 
Oscar  as  a  puppy  and  photo  B  shows  Oscar  as  an  old  dog  with  a  gray  nose.  In  other  words,  A  has 
no  gray  nose  while  B  has  a  gray  nose.  At  first  glance,  A  and  B  contradict  LL  because  they  are 
photos  of  the  same  dog  while  the  photos  have  different  properties.  However,  proponents  of  LL 
propose  creative  solutions  to  the  puzzle.  The  two  most  popular  solutions  follow.  One  solution 
says  that  simple  properties  such  as  having  a  gray  nose  are  relations  to  times  that  cohere  with  LL 
and  diachronic  identity.  The  other  solution  relies  on  the  position  of  real  temporal  parts  that 
implies  Oscar  is  an  entity  that  is  extended  in  time  in  the  same  way  that  Oscar  is  extended  in 
space  while  the  puppy  Oscar  and  the  old  Oscar  with  a  gray  nose  are  distinct  parts  of  the  whole 
temporally  extended  Oscar.  In  this  case,  A  and  B  are  not  photos  of  Oscar  but  photos  of  different 
parts  of  Oscar. 
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 The  former  solution  implies  that  LL  does  not  imply  that  identical  entities  exhibit  absolute 
identicalness  to  each  other.  The  latter  solution  implies  that  A  and  B  are  not  identical  because  they 
are  photos  of  different  temporal  parts  of  Oscar.  In  other  words,  all  temporal  parts  of  Oscar  have 
always  existed  and  will  always  exist  while  different  ages  of  Oscar  are  different  temporal  parts  of 
Oscar  and  likewise  lack  identicalness. 
I  feel  dissatisfied  with  both  solutions. 
The  former  solution  implies  that  A  and  B  can  have  different  properties  in  the  context  of 
LL.  In  other  words,  A  and  B  do  not  correspond  to  the  x  and  y  in  the  LL  formula.  Ultimately,  this 
interpretation  of  LL  defines  that  Oscar  is  something  other  than  all  the  properties  of  Oscar  at  any 
given  time  of  Oscar's  life.  I  agree  with  the  former  solution  in  that  the  identity  of  Oscar  does  not 
depend  on  all  the  properties  of  Oscar,  but  I  nonetheless  do  not  see  that  this  solution  does  justice 
to  LL  because  A  and  B  do  not  correspond  to  x  and  y . 
The  latter  solution  does  justice  to  LL  while  the  solution  implies  that  A  and  B  do  not 
correspond  to  x  and  y .  For  example,  the  temporal  parts  solution  relies  on  the  B-theory  of  time  or 
eternalism  that  imply  all  observations  and  experiences  of  tensed  time  are  illusory.  In  this  case,  A 
and  B  are  different  parts  of  Oscar  and  likewise  LL  stands  while  A  and  B  are  nonetheless  related 
to  each  other  because  they  are  parts  of  Oscar.  Also,  temporal  parts  are  real  while  diachronic 
identity  is  illusory.  However,  if  all  positions  along  the  line  of  B-theory  or  eternalism  are  false, 
then  the  solution  is  nothing  more  than  a  hypothetical  thought  exercise  based  on  unreality.  For 
instance,  Goetz  (forthcoming:  section  2.7)  analyzes  B-theory  and  eternalism  while  demonstrating 
that  the  theory  of  relativity  does  not  imply  B-theory  or  eternalism.  Furthermore,  if  any  proposal 
of  temporal  parts  is  true  for  some  reason  other  than  the  theory  of  relativity,  then  temporal  parts 
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 are  irrelevant  to  scientific  data  collection  and  legal  systems  because  nobody  can  possibly  observe 
temporal  parts  that  extend  into  the  relative  future.  Likewise,  in  this  case,  the  compelling  illusion 
of  diachronic  identity  is  practical  while  details  of  real  temporal  parts  in  the  relative  future  are 
unknowable  and  similarly  irrelevant. 
Another  problem  for  LL  is  standard  jurisprudence  in  the  cases  of  synchronic  II,  that  is, 
natural  persons  who  are  proprietorships  or  political  offices.  For  example,  LL  coheres  with  unreal 
II  and  uncoheres  with  any  real  II. 
In  sum,  LL  coheres  with  unreal  diachronic  identity  and  unreal  standard  jurisprudence, 
while  likewise  LL  uncoheres  with  real  diachronic  identity  and  real  standard  jurisprudence.  Also, 
section  3  supports  the  unimportance  of  LL. 
 
4.  Normativity 
The  term  normativity  without  context  is  ambiguous  because  it  could  refer  to  social  norms  which 
are  phenomena  or  moral  facts  which  are  concepts.  For  example,  Putnam  (2015)  proposes  that 
normativity  and  reason  cohere  with  liberal  naturalism  and  metaphysics  realism.  His  references  to 
normativity  and  reason  refer  to  facts  and  truth  values  which  are  outside  of  Field's  (1972) 
physicalism.  I  agree  with  Putnam  and  extend  liberal  naturalism  and  metaphysical  realism  to 
include  unobservable  material  that  has  observable  effects.  This  section  describes  the  relationship 
between  moral  facts  and  social  norms. 
Natural  law  theory  proposes  the  reality  of  moral  facts  while  legal  positivism  and  legal 
realism  propose  the  unreality  of  moral  facts.  In  other  words,  natural  law  theory  proposes  moral 
realism  while  legal  positivism  and  legal  realism  propose  moral  anti-realism. 
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 Moral  realism  can  take  many  forms  (Railton  1986;  Goetz  2014).  It  could  be  theistic  or 
nontheistic.  It  also  could  be  deontological;  consequential;  or  a  mix  of  deontology  and 
consequentialism.   For  example,  a  deontologist  could  say  that  considering  the  consequences  of 8
actions  is  a  moral  duty. 
I  define  that  moral  facts  by  themselves  are  abstract  entities.  Alternatively,  human 
knowledge  of  a  moral  fact  is  a  phenomenon  and  likewise  a  material  entity.  Also,  if  some  form  of 
theism  is  true,  then  divine  knowledge  of  moral  facts  is  a  divine  entity.  Furthermore,  moral 
realism  implies  the  reality  of  moral  facts  about  any  given  social  norm.  For  example,  a  social 
norm  could  objectively  be  morally  good,  morally  neutral,  morally  evil,  or  a  mixture  of  good, 
neutral,  or  evil. 
The  global  consensus  of  jurists  endorse  the  reality  of  human  rights  (Nickel  2019),  while 
human  rights  are  a  form  of  moral  facts.  This  implies  that  knowledge  of  various  moral  facts  is  a 
verified  scientific  entity.  Also,  scientific  research  focusing  on  the  consequences  of  safety 
procedures  results  in  new  social  norms  that  include  laws  (Goetz  2014:  34–35).  Likewise,  these 
social  norms  are  based  on  scientific  research. 
Alternatively,  moral  anti-realism  can  accept  the  material  reality  of  social  norms  while 
rejecting  the  reality  of  moral  facts.  For  example,  moral  anti-realism  commonly  takes  the  form  of 
moral  relativism  that  says  no  moral  judgement  is  objectively  true  or  false  while  any  moral 
judgement  is  true  or  false  only  relative  to  some  individual  or  group  (Joyce  2016). 
8  Positions  of  deontology  say  that  ethical  decisions  are  based  on  moral  duty,  while  positions  of 
consequentialism  say  that  ethical  decisions  are  based  on  examining  the  consequences  of  possible 
decisions. 
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 Consider  an  interesting  case  of  moral  relativism.  The  American  Anthropological 
Association  (AAA)  in  1947  stated  opposition  to  the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  of  the  United 
Nations  because  the  AAA  supposed  the  commission  would  represent  values  only  from  Western 
Europe  and  America  while  excluding  values  from  Asia  and  Africa  (Executive  Board  1947; 
Nickel  2019).  However,  human  rights  scholars  achieved  global  consensus  and  the  AAA 
eventually  endorsed  the  reality  of  human  rights  (Committee  for  Human  Rights  1999;  Nickel 
2019). 
Also,  consider  the  case  of  past  chattel  slavery  (Goetz  2014:  36).  Every  current  legal 
system  prohibits  slavery,  but  societies  and  great  minds  from  the  past  supported  slavery.  For 
example,  Aristotle  (350  BCE:  1.3–7)  said  that  some  humans  are  natural  slaves  while  other 
humans  are  natural  free  persons.  He  somehow  justified  the  Grecian  enslavement  of  humans 
including  various  skilled  artisans  and  pedagogues.  In  this  case,  a  moral  relativist  cannot  say  that 
chattel  slavery  is  objectively  or  mind-independently  wrong  while  a  moral  realist  can  say  that 
chattel  slavery  is  mind-independently  wrong  despite  past  societies  that  legalized  it  and  great 
minds  such  as  Aristotle  who  justified  it. 
I  also  speculate  that  if  we  could  resurrect  Aristotle  and  give  him  a  few  years  to  study 
contemporary  social  science,  then  he  would  recant  his  past  support  of  slavery. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The  no  miracles  argument  coheres  with  the  LAI,  LNC,  and  PB.  My  paper  introduces  a  model  of 
social  systems  ranging  from  jawless  vertebrates  to  legal  systems  that  coheres  with  the  no 
miracles  argument.  Major  focuses  of  the  model  are  the  natural  interactions  that  cause 
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 organization,  the  dynamics  of  scientific  entities,  and  the  composition  of  social  groups  which 
includes  communication  and  the  emergence  of  synergy. 
All  social  animals  have  a  natural  inclination  to  belong  to  a  social  group  while  group 
communication  unifies  any  social  group.  Also,  primates  have  a  natural  inclination  to  develop 
social  norms.  Furthermore,  humans  who  develop  farms  have  a  natural  inclination  to  develop 
legal  systems,  while  the  legal  systems  are  made  of  both  observable  material  and  unobservable 
material.  Moreover,  understanding  natural  organization  and  the  existence  of  unobservable 
jurisprudential  material  resolves  puzzles  about  identity  and  mereology. 
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